سکوت

have ever declared that their problems lie at a different level from the problems of the empirical sciences.  Perhaps one may agree with this assertion; the question is, however,   where should one seek this level.

The metaphysicians wish to seek their object behind the objects  of  empirical  science;  they  wish  to  enquire after the essence, the ultimate cause of things. But the logical analysis of the pretended propositions of metaphysics  has shown that they are not propositions  at  all,  but  empty  word  arrays, which on account of notional and  emotional  connections  arouse the  false  appearance  of  being  propositions.   This   conception that the "propositions" of metaphysics, including those of ethics, have no theoretical content,  is  to  be  sure  still  disputed.  We shall not, however,  enter  here  on  its  demonstration,  but,  under its guidance, will limit ourselves to non-metaphysical and non­ ethical   (non-evaluating)   philosophical  problems.

1  Translated  by  W.  M.  Malisolf.   Attention  is called  to  the  following  choices  taken by the translator:-Aujfassung has been rendered variously as interpretation, conception, position; Folgerung as deduction, conclusion, inference, but in conformance with the discussion, most often as entailment. Gehalt which  may  mean  value, has been  rendered only as content; lnhalt as meaning; but inhaltlich as connotative, rather than strict or mean­ ingful or intensional, which  may  convey  as much.

In order to discover the correct standpoint of  the  philosopher, which  differs  from  that   of  the  empirical   investigator,   we  must not penetrate behind the objects of empirical science  into  pre­ sumably  some  kind  of  transcendent  ievel;  on  the  contrary  we must take a step back and take science itself as the object.  Phi­ losophy  is the theory of science  (wherein  here and in the  following

"science" is always meant in the comprehensive sense of the collective system of the knowledge of any kind of entity; physical and psychic, natural and  social  entities).  This  must  be  ap­ praised more closely. One may consider science from various viewpoints; e.g. whether one can institute a psychological in­ vestigation considering the activities of observation, deduction, formulation of theories, etc., or sociological investigations con­ cerning the economical and cultural conditions of the pursuit of science.  These  provinces-although   most   important-are   not meant here. Psychology and  sociology  are  empirical  sciences; they do not belong to philosophy even though they are often pursued by the same person, and have torn loose from  philosophy as independent branches of science only in our own times. Phi­ losophy  deals with science only from  the logical  viewpoint. Phi­

losophy  is  the  logic  of science,  i.e.,  the  logical   analysis   of  the

concepts, propositions, proofs, theories of science, as well as of those which we select in available science as common to the possible methods of constructing concepts, proofs, hypotheses, theories. [What one used to call epistemology or theory of knowledge is a mixture of applied logic and psychology (and at times even metaphysics); insofar as this theory is logic it is in­ cluded in what we call logic of science; insofar, however, as it is psychology, it does not belong to philosophy, but to empirical science.]

The interpretation  that  philosophy  is the logic of science is not to be justified here. It has been represented previously and is represented now by various philosophic groups, amongst  others also by our Vienna circle. With this thesis the question as to the character of philosophic problems is not by any means already solved.  Very  much  comes  into  question  right   at   this  point. We should  consequently  ask  here:  what  character,  what logical

nature, do the questions and answers of the logic of science have? For those who are with us in  the conception  that  philosophy  is the logic of science the question of the character of philosophic problems will be answered thereby as well.

ARE   THE    PROPOSITIONS   OF  THE   LOGIC  OF  SCIENCE  MEANINGLESS?

Our antimetaphysical position has been formulated by Hume in  the  classical manner:-

"It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and num­ ber are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions."-Hume, An Enquiry Con­ cerning Human  Understanding, XII, 3.

Against this the following objection, which on first appearance seems indeed destructive, has been repeatedly raised:-"If every proposition which does not belong either to mathematics or to the empirical investigation of facts, is meaningless, how does it fare then with your own propos tions? You positivists and antimetaphysicians yourselves cut off the branch on which you sit." This objection indeed touches upon a decisive point. It should be of interest to every philosopher as well as metaphysician to comprehend the character of the propositions of the logic of science; but to the antimetaphysician, who identifies philosophy and the logic of science, this is the deciding question, upon the satisfactory answer of which the security of his standpoint de­ pends.

Wittgenstein has represented with especial  emphasis  the thesis of  the  meaninglessness of  metaphysical  propositions  and  of the

identity of philosophy and the logic of science; especially through him has the Vienna circle been developed  on  this  point.  How now does Wittgenstein dispose of the objection that his own prop­ ositions  are also meaningless?  He  doesn't  at  all; he agrees with it! He is  of  the  opinion  that  the  non-metaphysical  philosophy also has no propositions; it operates with words, the meaningless­ ness of  which in  the end it itself  must recognize:-

"Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions," but to make propositions clear."  (p. 77)

"My propositions are elucidatory  in  this  way:  he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them,  on  them,  over  them.                     (He  must  so  to  speak  throw  away  the ladder, after  he has climbed  up on it.)                                    He  must  surmount these propo­ sitions;  then   he  sees  the world  rightly.                                       Whereof  one cannot  speak, thereof  one  must  be  silent."  (p.  189,   Tractatus Logico-philosophicus)

We shall try in the following to give in place of this radically negative answer a positive answer to  the question  of the character of the propositions of the logic of science and thereby of phi­ losophy.

CONNOTATIVE   AND   FORMAL  CONSIDERATION

(Inhaltliche  und  formale Betrachtung)

To construct science means to construct a system of prop­ ositions which stand in certain fundamental coherence with one another.      The logic of science is thus  the logical  analysis  of this system, of its elements and of the methods of tying these elements. In such an analysis we can start from but two different view­ points; we  shall  call  them  connotative  (inhaltlich) and  formal. It is usual in the logic of science to put something like the following and similar questions:  What  is  the  meaning  of  this or  that  concept?            In   what   relation   does  the  meaning of  this concept  stand  with  respect to that?         Is  the meaning  of this con­ cept  more  fundamental   than of  that?      What  meaning  (Inhalt, Gehalt)                   does   this   proposition                 have?                       (Or:  What    does  this

propos1t1on say?)    Is  the  meaning of  this proposition  contained in  the  meaning  of that?             Does  this  proposition  say more than that?     Is  what  this  proposition  asserts,  necessary or contingent or impossible?           Is  what  these  two  propositions say compatible? All these questions refer to the meaning of concepts and prop­ ositions.   We  call  them   therefore  questions  of  meaning  or  of connotation (inhaltliche).     In  contrast  to  this  we understand  by formal questions and propositions such as relate only to  the formal structure of the propositions, i.e. to the arrangement and kind of symbols (e.g. words) out of which a proposition is con­ structed, without reference to the meaning of the symbols and pro­ positions.                Formal  (in  the sense  here defined)  are e.g.  (most of)

the  rules  of grammar.

According to  prevalent  conception  the  connotative  questions of the logic of science are much richer and fruitful  than  the formal; though the formal do belong to the logic of science, they are at most a small, insignificant section. But  this  opinion  is wrong. The logic of science can progress without exception according to the formal method without thereby restricting the wealth of questioning. It is possible in case of purely formal procedure, that is from a viewpoint in which one does not reckon with the meaning, finally to arrive to the answering of all those questions which are formulated as connotative questions. This possibility is to be shown illustratively in the following. There­ with the question of the character of philosophy as logic of science

is  answered:  it  is the formal  structure  theory  of the  language of

science,-we shall call it: The logical syntax of the language of science.

LOGICAL   SYNTAX   OF LANGUAGE

By the "logical syntax" (or also briefly "syntax") of a language we shall understand the system of the formal (i.e. not referring to meaning) rules of  that  language,  as well as  to  the consequences of these rules. Therein we deal first with the formative rules (Formregeln) which  decree  how from  the  symbols  (e.g. words) of the language propositions can be built up, secondly with the transformation rules (Unformungsregeln), which decree how from

given  propositions  new  ones  can  be  derived.  If  the  rules  are set up strictly formally they furnish  mechanical  operations  with the symbols of the  language.   The  formation  and  transformation of propositions resembles chess: like chess figures words are here combined and manipulated according  to  definite  rules.  But thereby we do not say that language is nothing but a game  of figures; it is not denied that the words and propositions have a meaning; one merely  averts  methodically  from  meaning.  One may express it  also thus:  language is treated as a calculus.

That the formal, calculus-like representation of the  formative rules is possible is evident.   What  linguists call rules of syntax   are indeed such formal  (or  at  least  formally  expressible)  rules for the formation of propositions. We can see, however, clearly  that the transformation rules,  which  one  usually  calls  logical rules of deduction, have the same formal, that is, syntactical character. (And that is the reason why we  call  the  combined system of rules syntax, in widening the terminology of linguists). Since Aristotle the efforts of logicians (more or less consciously) were directed toward formulating  the deductive  rules as formally as possible, i.e. possibly so that with their  help  the conclusion could  be  "calculated"  mechanically  from  the  premisses.  This was attained first in a strict manner only  in  modern  symbolic logic; the  traditional  logic was  too much  hindered  by  the defect of the language of words.

For a certain part of the language of science we already know a strictly formal theory, namely  Hilbert's  mathematics.  It  con­ siders the symbols and formulas of mathematics without reference to meaning, in order to investigate relations of deducibility, sufficiency, consistency, etc. This mathematics is hence (in our manner of expression) the logical syntax of mathematical  lan­ guage.  The  logical syn tax of the language of science meant here is an analogous  extension  with  reference  to  the language  of  all of science.

One of the most important concepts of logic and thereby of the logic of science is that of (logical) inference (Folgerung-entail­ ment).   Can   this  concept   be  formulated   purely  formally?    It is  often  stated   that   the  relation  of  entailment  depends  on the

meaning of the propositions. In a certain  sense  we can  agree  with that; for when  the  meaning  of  two  propositions  is  known, it is thereby determined whether one is  the  entailment  of  the other or not.  The decisive point,  however, is:  is it  also possible  to  formulate  the   concept   "entailment"   purely   formally?   If the transformation rules of language are set  up purely  formally, we call a proposition an inference (entailment) of other proposi­ tions if it can be constructed from those propositions by the application of the transformation rules. The question, whether a certain proposition is an inference (entailment) of certain other propositions or not, is therefore completely analogous to the question whether a certain position in chess can be played from another or not. This question is answered by chess theory, i.e. a combinatorial or mathematical investigation  which  is  based  on the chess rules; that question is thus  a formal one, it  is answered by a Combinatorial Calculus or Mathematics of Language, which rests on the transformation rules of language,  that  is  what  we have    called    the   syntax    of   language.    Briefly:  "entailment" is defined as deducibility according to the transformation rules; since these rules are formal, "entailment" is also a formal, syn­ tactical concept.

The concept "entailment" is, as Lewis has correctly seen, quite different  from  the  concept  of  "(material)  implication."  (Rus­ sell,  Principles  of  Mathematics).  Implication  does  not  depend on the sense of the propositions,  but  only  on  their truth-value; but entailment on the contrary  is  not  quite  determined  by  the truth  values.   From  this,  however,  one  may  not  conclude  that in the determination of entailment reference to the meaning is necessary; it suffices to refer to the formal structure of the propositions.

THE    CONTENT   OF   A PROPOSITION

On the basis of the concept "entailment" one can define the following  classification  of  propositions   which   is  fundamental to the logic of science. A proposition is called analytic (or tautological) if it is an entailment of every proposition (more exactly:  if it  is deducible without  premisses, or is the  entailment

of the empty class of propositions). A proposition 1s called contradictory if any proposition at all is its entailment. A propo­ sition is called synthetic if it is neither analytical  nor  contradic­ tory.   Example:  "It   is  raining  here" is synthetic;  "It   is  raining or it is not raining" is analytic; "It  is  raining  and it  is  not rain­ ing" is contradictory. An analytic proposition is true in every possible case and therefore does not state  which  case  is on  hand. A contradictory propostion on  the  contrary says  too  much, it  is not  true in any possible case.   A synthetic proposition is true only in certain cases,and states therefore that one of these cases is being considered,-all (true or false)  statements  of  fact  are  synthetic. The concepts "analytic," "contradictory," "synthetic" can be de­ fined in analogous manner also for classes of propositions; several propositions are said to be incompatible (unvertraglich) with one another, if their class is contradictory.

And now we come to the  principal  concept  of  the  logic  of science,  the  concept  of  the   (Inhalt)   content   of   a   proposition. Can   this  central  concept  of  the  connotative   (inhaltliche)   method of  consideration   be  formulated   purely   formally   also?   We   can be  easily  convinced   that   that  is  possible.    For  what,  to  be sure, do we want to know when we ask  concerning  the  content  or meaning of a proposition  S?  We wish  to know what S conveys  to  us;  what  we  experience  through  S;  what  we  can  take  out  of  S. In other words: we ask what we can deduce from  S;  more  ac­ curately:  what   propositions   are   entailments   of   S    which    are not already entailments of any  proposition  at  all,  and  therefore declare   nothing.    We  define  therefore:  by   the   content   (Gehalt) of a proposition S we understand the class of entailments  from  S which  are  not  analytic.  Thereby  the   concept   "Gehalt"   is connected  to  the  syntactical  concepts  defined  earlier;  it   is  then also  a  syntactic,  a  purely  formal  concept.     From   this   definition it  is  apparent  that  the  content  of  an  analytic  proposition   is empty, since no non-analytic proposition is an entailment  of  it. Further, that the content  of  S2 is  obtained  from  that  of  S1  when and only  when  S2  is  an  entailment  of  S1; that  two  propositions are  of  equal  content  when  and  only  when  each  is  the  entailment of  the  other.     Thus   the  defined   concept   "Content" corresponds

completely to what we mean when we (in a vague manner) are accustomed to speak of the "meaning"  (Inhalt)  of a  proposition;  at any rate, insofar as by "meaning" something logical is meant. Often in the investigation of the "meaning" or "sense" of a prop­ osition one also means: What does  one  think  of or  imagine  in this proposition?  This,  however,  is  a  psychological  question with which  we have nothing  to do in a logical investigation.

CONNOTATIVE   AND   FORMAL   MODES   OF  EXPRESSION

(Inhaltliche  und formale Redeweise)

We have set out from the fact that a language can  be con­ sidered in two different ways: in a connotative and in a formal manner.   Now,  however,  we have  established  that  with  the  aid of the formal method the questions  of  the  connotative approach can  also   be  answered   finally.   Fundamentally   really  there  is no difference between the two approaches, but only a difference between two modes of expression: in the investigation of a language, its concepts and propositions and the relations between them, one can employ either  the connotative  or  the formal  mode of expression. The connotative mode of expression is more customary and obvious; but one must use it with great care, it frequently begets muddles and  pseudo-problems.  We  shall consider several examples of  propositions  in  connotative  form and their translation into formal mode of speech; in the case of several of these examples (6a-10a) only on translation  do we see that we are dealing with assertions concerning  the language.

Connotative Mode of Speech:

ra. The propositions of arithmetical lan­ guage give the properties of numbers and  relations  between them.

Formal Mode  of Speech

rb. The propositions of arithmetical lan­ guage are constructed in  such  and such a manner from predicates of one or more values and number expres- sions  as arguments.

2a.  The c;:xpression '5' and '3+2' mean the  2b. 3b.  The  expressions '5'  and  '3+2'  are

same number.                                                                                        synonymous in  the arithmetical lan- 3a. '5'  and '3+2'  do not  mean the same                                                                                guage  (i.e.  always  interchangeable

number but two equal numbers.                            with one another).

On the basis  of  the  connotative  formulation  Ia  there  arise easily   a   number   of  metaphysical pseudo-problems  concermng

the nature of numbers, whether the numbers are real or ideal, whether  they  are extra- or intramental  and  the like.   The  danger of these pseudo-problems disappears when we use  the  formal mode of expression, where we speak of "number expressions" instead  of  "numbers."   Also  the  philosophic   conflict   between 2a and 3a disappears in the formal mode of  expression:  both theses  have  the  same translation.

4a.  The  word  "luna"  of  the  Latin  lan­ guage signifies the moon.

5a. The concept "red" signifies an ulti­ mate quality;  the concept "man" has a more ultimate meaning than the con­ cept "grandson."

6a.  The moon is a thing;  the sum of 3 and

2  is not  a  thing but  a number.

7a.  A property is not a thing.

Sa. This particular (fact, event, condition) is logically necessary: .... logically impossible; .•.. logically possible.

9a. This particular (fact, event, condition) is physically necessary; . . . . physi­ cally impossible; ..•. physicall1 pos­ sible.

10a.  Reality consists of facts, not of things.

4b. On the basis of the syntactical trans­ lation rules between  the  Latin  and the English languages the  word "moon" is coordinated with the word "luna."

5b. The word "red" is an undefined fundamental symbol of language; the word "man" stands on a lower level that the word "grandson" in the definition  family-tree  of concepts.

6b. "Moon" is the designation of a thing; "3+2" is not a designation of a thing but a designation  of a number.

7b. A property-word is not a thing-word. Sb. This proposition is analytic; •... contradictory;..•. not contradictory.

9b. This proposition is deducible from the class of physical laws; .... is incompatible with •••.;....is com­ patible.....

rnb. Science is a system of propositions, not of names.

PHILOSOPHY  IS  THE   SYNTAX   OF  THE   LANGUAGE   OF SCIENCE

We had started with the presupposition:  Philosophy  of Science is the logic of science, the logical analysis of concepts, propositions, structures of propositions of  science.  Since  now  the  data  of every logical analysis can be translated in the formal mode of expression, all the questions and theorems of philosophy con­ sequently find their place in the formal structure theory of language, that is, in  the realm  which  we have  called  the Syntax of the language  of  Science.  Here  it  must,  however,  be  noted that a philosophic theorem,  formulated  as  a  proposition  of syntax,  can  be meant  in  different ways:

1. As Assertion; e.g.
   1. In the language of science available  today  (or a part of  it: of physics,  biology, ...  ) such  and such holds.
   2. In every language (or: in every language of such and such a nature)  such  and such holds.
   3. There is a language  for which such and such  holds.
   2. As  Proposal;  e.g.
   1. I propose to build up the language of science (or of mathe­ matics, of psychology, ... ) so  that  it  acquires  such  and such properties.
   2. I wish (along with other things) to investigate a language which possesses such and such properties.

The common confusion in philosophic discussions, not only among metaphysicians but also in the philosophy of science, is principally called forth by lack of a clear conception  that  the object of discussion is the language of science; and further  be­ cause one does not clearly state (and mostly does not  know oneself) whether a thesis is meant as an assertion or as a proposal. Let us consider, for example, in the discussion of the logical foundations of mathematics a point of conflict between the logisticists (Frege, Russell) and  the axiomatists  (Peano, Hilbert); let the theses be formulated by 12a, 13a. Then we translate the theses in order to formulate them more exactly into the formal mode of expression: 12b, 13b.

r 2a. The numbers are classes of classes of things.

r3a. The numbers are unique ultimate en­ tities.

r2b. The number-symbols are class sym­ bols of second rank.

r3b. The number-symbols are individual­ symbols (i.e. symbols of null rank, which   appear   only   as arguments).

If now we interpret 12b and 13b in the manner A3, the conflict disappears: one can say that a language of arithmetic is con­ structible which has the property 12b; but also one as well which has the property 13b.  But  perhaps  the  theses  12b,  13b  are meant as proposals in  the sense B1,  In  that case one is not deal­ ing with a discussion about true or false, but  with a discussion  as to whether this or that mode of expression is simpler or more pertinent  (for certain  purposes  of a scientific  methodical nature).

In any case the discussion is oblique and fruitless as long as the discussers do not agree as to which of the interpretation A or B is meant. The situation is similar with regard to the philo­ sophical combat concerning the theses 14a, 15a:

14a.  To the ultimate given  belong relations.

I 5a. Relations are never given  ultimately but depend always on the nature of the members of  the relation.

14b. To the undefined fundamental signs belong two- (or more-) valued predi­ cates.

15b. All two- or more-valued  predicates are defined on the basis of one-valued predicates.

The discussion becomes clear only when 14b and I 5b are con­ sidered as proposals; the problem then consists of putting up language·s of this or that form and to compare  them  to  one another.

In the following example we deal with the  conflict  of  two theses 16a, 17a, which correspond more or less to positivism and to realism.

16a. .II thing is a complex of sensations.

17a.  A thing is a complex of atoms.

16b. Every proposition in which a thing­ name occurs,  is  of  equal  content with a class of propositions in which no thing-names but sensation-names occur,

17b. Every proposition in which a thing­ name occurs is of equal  content  with a proposition in which no  thing names but  space-time  coordinates and  physical  functions occur.

16b, 17b can be interpreted here in the sense A1, namely as as­ sertions concerning the syn tactical structure of our language of science. In spite of that  they  do  not  contradict  one  another; since a proposition conce!'ning a thing can  be  transformed  in more than one way with equal content. We  see: in  using  the formal mode of expression the pseudo-problem "What is a thing?" disappears, and therewith the opposition  between  the  positivist and  the realist  answer disappears.

If we represent the position that all philosophical problems are questions   of  the  syntax  of   the   language   of  science,  we  do not

mean  it  to  be  a  proposal  or  even  a  prescription  for limitation

to a definite, seemingly very narrow  field  of questions.  Much more is meant:  as soon  as  one exactly  formulates  some question of philosophy  as logic of science, one notes  that it is a question   of the logical analysis of the language of science; and further investigation then  teaches  that  each  such  question  allows  itself to be formulated as a formal question, to wit a question of the syntax of the language of science. All theorems  of  philosophy  take on an exact, discussable form only when we formulate  them as assertions or proposals of the syn tax of the language of science.

THE    PROBLEM   OF   THE    FOUNDATIONS   OF   THE SCIENCES

In order to make dearer our  position  concerning  the character of philosophic problems, we shall cast a brief glance on the problems which one customarily designates as the philosophic foundation  problems of the  individual sciences.

The philosophic problems of the foundations  of mathematics are the  questions  of  the  syntax  of  mathematical  language,  and to be sure not as of an isolated language, but  as of a part language of the language of science. This addendum  is important.  The logistic trend (Frege, Russell) is right in the demand that the foundation laying of mathematics must not only construct the mathematical calculus but also must make clear the meaning of mathematical concepts, since the application of mathematics to reality rests on this meaning. We restate it in formal mode  of speech:  mathematical  concepts  attain  their   meaning   by   the fact that the rules of their application in empirical  science  are given. If we investigate not only the syntactical rules of mathe­ matical language merely, but also the rules which relate to the appearance of  mathematical  symbols  in  synthetic  propositions, we  formulate  thereby  the  meaning  of  mathematical  concepts (e.g. the meaning of the symbol "2" is formulated by establishing how this symbol can appear in synthetic propositions, and ac­ cording to what rules such propositions can be derived from propositions without number expressions.  If  a rule is set up with the aid of which one can derive  from  the  proposition  "In  this room there are Peter and Paul and otherwise no person" the proposition  "In  this  room  there  are  2  people,"  the  meaning  of "2"    is established  by that rule).

The problems of the foundations of physics are questions of the syntax of physical language: the problem of the verification of physical laws is the question concerning the syntactic deductive coherence between the physical laws  (i.e. general  propositions  of a certain form) and the protocol propositions (singular  proposi­ tions of a certain form); the problem of induction is the question whether and which transformation rules lead from protocol propositions to laws; the problem of the finitude or infinity  and other structure properties of time and space is the question concerning  the  syntactical   transformation  rules  with   reference to number expressions  which  appear in the physical  propositions as time and space coordinates; the problem of causalty is the question concerning  the  syntactical  structure  of  the  physical laws (whether unique or probability functions) and concerning a certain property of completeness of the system of these laws (determinism-indeterminism).

The philosophical problems of the foundation of  biology  refer above  all  to   the  relation   between   biology  and   physics.   Here the following  two  problems  are  to  be distinguished:

1. Can the concepts of biology be defined on the basis of the concepts of physics? (If  yes, the language of  biology is a  part language  of  physical language).

2. Can the laws of biology be derived from the laws of the physics of the inorganic? The second question forms  the kernel of the vitalism-problem, if we purge  this  problem from  the usual metaphysical admixtures.

Among the problems of the foundations of psychology there are analogously to the above-mentioned: I. Can the  concepts  of psychology   be  defined  on  the  basis  of  the  concepts  of   physics?

2. Can the laws of psychology be derived from those of physics? The so-called psycho-physical problem is usually formulated as a problem of the relation of two  object-realms: the  realm  of  psychic events and the realm of physical events. But this formulation leads to a maze of pseudo-problems. In using the formal mode of expression it becomes clear that  one  is dealing only with  the relation  of  both  part-languages, that of psychology